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hat Milton is not Shakespeare has been a common judgment, and one rarely 
decided in Milton’s favor. So it should come as no surprise that, as Will 
Stockton observes, queer readers have voted with their feet for the 
capacious, inclusive universe of Shakespeare studies and its many possible worlds. 
But if Dr. Johnson (who also disliked Shakespeare’s tragedies) was not entirely 
wrong to say that no one ever wished Paradise Lost longer, that is because Milton’s 
epic tends to be viewed not as literature but as versified ontology—the work of 
someone who knew, or thought he knew, the fundamental order of things. 
Whether this is what Milton meant by having his speaker propose to “assert eternal 
providence and justify the ways of God to men,” such assumptions are nothing 
new (Dr. Johnson himself having entertained them). Indeed, they appear 
congenital to the public reception, if not the poetic project of Paradise Lost. Homer 
and Virgil wrote epics filled with gods, but theology then is mythology to us now, 
and we do not take the judgments of Zeus or Jupiter personally. Dante, it is true, 
did undertake to picture metaphysical reality in the Commedia, with the result that 
popular demand for the Inferno vastly outstrips the Purgatorio and Paradiso because 
the penalties of sin are so much more entertaining than the rewards of saintliness. 
Indeed, the American reading public may adore the occult (zombies, vampires, 
demons), the supernatural (angels and the divine in mufti), and the extraterrestrial 
(alien abductions, Area 51); it may devour each new report back from heaven, the 
Light or the inside of the mothership; but it dislikes being judged, least of all 
eternally, by anyone not simpatico. In literary studies too and for much the same 
cause, the Judeo-Christian God still gets under our skin, which is why critics prefer 
their divinity, if they must have one at all, served up in multiple, obscure and exotic 
mediations, or dispensed with altogether, usually by calling it something else, like 
heteronormativity.  
Early modern culture had a greater tolerance for this God than we do. 
Nonetheless, like ourselves, it was inclined to make deity over in its own image—
an image almost as patriarchal as ever Jehovah had been and, as Milton often 
complains, altogether unlike the Jesus of the gospels. In making religious or civil 
law, the tendency was to ignore all but a few sentences of the New Testament, 
while borrowing liberally from the Old and whatever tribal tradition or 
immemorial custom lay to hand. Further, as Ian Maclean has argued, both ancient 
and scholastic authorities ensured that the culture clung to a set of gender values 
as venerable and largely identical with the Pythagorean contraries or “principles of 
things” that Aristotle discusses in the Metaphysics: “limit and unlimited, odd and 
even, one and plurality, right and left, male and female, rest and movement, 








b). And precisely because it was a patriarchy in every sense, early modern culture 
conceived a horror of gender contingency, in the unsurprising belief that such 
instability threatened the very foundations of its order. So, in Ben Jonson’s neat 
phrase from Epicoene, “female vice should be a virtue male, / Or masculine vice, a 
female virtue be” (12-13)—a gender dictum pervading the literature of the age but 
not always in the same way, or even with the dominant significance of world 
subversion, as Shakespeare’s romantic comedies abundantly imply (Jonson 292).  
Compared to Shakespeare (or Sidney or Spenser, Ariosto or Tasso), 
Milton’s poetry would appear to suffer from grave disadvantages in this regard, 
not all of which are owing to the Father’s presence on the set: because everyone 
is naked, there are no pants roles in Paradise Lost (although Eve does wear them in 
Book Nine while Dalila hid them beneath her skirts). Nor does epic afford the 
theatrical occasion for boys to play girls (although Raphael and the Lord seem to 
think Adam comes close, and Samson fears the same for himself). Of course, 
Milton’s only play is a closet drama (the theaters being closed for the Interregnum), 
and to that extent cannot be said to court the psychological plague of spontaneous 
deviance predicted by anti- theatricalists (although Drew Daniel suggests the tragic 
hero himself is one of them). Besides, Samson, once shorn and now eyeless in 
Gaza, has biblical authority for his emasculation, as Dalila does for her virility. In 
both of Milton’s epics, the tropological contagion of effeminacy appears confined 
to the dim, sybaritic Belial (Daniel), but only if we ignore the classical and humanist 
topos of tyranny that decks out Milton’s devil, whose operatic loquacity, histrionic 
duplicity, vulgar opulence and sheer snobbery clearly announce the return of the 
repressed king, or queen. It also signals Satan’s capacity for the polymorphous-
perverse pleasure-seeking that republican polemic ascribed to tyrants and court 
parasites, and that Lynn Hunt has termed the “pornography” of political 
absolutism. Similarly, when prelates and priests make their figurative appearance, 
which they do promiscuously in the tracts and when one least expects it in the 
poetry, the imagery of autoeroticism expands exponentially. And that is because, 
if one is a dissenting Protestant in this tragic age of religious civil war, Roman and 
Anglican Catholicism are made the font of all perceived perversions.  
Yet the ribald sexual imagination and robust bawdy which permeate most 
early modern literature and of course Shakespeare seem barely to break the surface 
of Milton’s poetry, although when they do (Daniel), they can unmold the apparent 
sense of an entire passage. At the same time, his writing does not lack for full-
fledged eroticism. Adam, Satan and especially the epic narrator all have a thing for 
our General Mother, and so do Eden’s fruits and flowers. Eve herself moons over 
her fair outside, that is, until her reverie is broken by the divine imperative of 
species reproduction; but at the first sight of Adam’s sexual difference, she turns 
to flee back to her own delectable likeness. Yet even before Paradise Lost, the 
Circean sorcerer and proxy courtier, Comus, who is all urgent sentience and 
libertine sexuality, cannot keep his febrile touch off that notable invert, Milton’s 
Lady or the Lady Milton, whom he would divert, pervert and convert to his own 
circaddian rhythms (Melissa Sanchez). Owing to their refined substance, angelic 
bodies achieve a degree of interpenetration about which Donne’s or Rochester’s 







out of shame (since the unfallen are guiltless) but pleasure (Stephen Guy-Bray). 
And for those still curious, it appears true from the catalogue of demons that the 
capacity of angels to assume both male and female shapes does extend the sexual 
range of the apostate (Guy-Bray and Daniel).  
As the form of divine good, the power of beauty to entrance its beholders 
crosses not only genders but species and aeons (Guy-Bray). However perfect in 
his kind, Adam is entirely smitten by Raphael’s “glorious shape” (Guy-Bray) 
“whose excellence he saw / Transcend his own so far” that he doubts his own 
merely human adequacy (PL 5.456-58). Similarly, a pompous Satan, whose “glory 
obscured” moves all hell and Milton’s speaker (PL 1.594), pines for his lost beauty 
reflected in the unfallen cherubim he had thought to disdain, chagrined “chiefly 
to find here observed / His lustre visibly impaired” (LM:PL 4.844-50). For much 
the same reason as Eve’s absorption in her own watery image, the apostate hordes 
cannot avert their gaze from their great chief, which has truly spectacular 
consequences for all concerned in Book Ten. But while heroic homosociality 
seems to rule in Milton’s hell, with all that this might portend of subterranean 
passions, the apostate angels appear incapable of doing anything about it, so 
absorbed is each one in his own pathos. Narcissism also abounds in the nostalgia 
of the fallen for a lost heaven, where it complicates Satan’s feelings for his 
erstwhile God, whether Father, Son and Messiah, or Our Saviour in Paradise 
Regained, for whom he adopts the debonaire guise of “one in city, or court, or 
palace bred” (LM:PR 2.300), and lays a “table spread, in regal mode” with “Tall 
stripling youths rich-clad, of fairer hue/ Than Ganymede or Hylas,” along with 
nymphs, Naiades and “ladies of the Hesperides” (LM:PR 2.340, 352-57).  
Admittedly, these are themes and motifs whose significance finally 
depends on the poet’s usage; but Will is nonetheless right to say there is a case for 
queering Milton, unless one takes the carefully bald “argument” that prefaces each 
book of Paradise Lost as the totality of Milton’s poetic intent or the poem’s 
meaning. If we did, then there would be no Milton studies, and very likely no 
readers of Milton either. As always, the problem here is interpretive orthodoxy, 
which fluctuates with every new generation and every new trend; indeed, 
orthodoxies are conceived and promulgated for that very reason—opinion shifts, 
and it especially shifts when the question is a matter of interpretation (and what, 
said jesting Pilate, is not). Consensus is something different—a description of the 
state of our belief, not a proscription of it: consensus should still allow for dissent 
whereas dogma struggles to contain the instinctive human drive to make 
satisfactory sense of experience—to find the world meaningful and profound as 
well as uncertain, trivial, difficult, perplexing, appalling and even unspeakable. One 
would think that literary critics would know better by now, given the conviction 
of other academic fields (philosophy in particular) that our analyses lack 
rigorousness, rest on wholly insufficient grounds, are merely “subjective,” 
whatever that means.  
But the hope for some self-skepticism as well as critical tolerance of 
others’ opinions must confront our visceral attachment to our own ideas as true, 
right and just—God to us—whether they can take the form of received 







articulate and evident. Such passionate belief, or more properly, identification with 
what we ourselves think makes every student of any subject dismissive in private, 
where we can be pleasurably alone with our own dogmas. But since we publish 
those opinions as part of our profession, literary critics like all academics must 
confront the fact of a plurality of views, however configured by intellectual vogues 
or disciplinary consensus. And while we may silently crave to make our dogma 
everyone else’s, it never can and never should be, because to do so transforms 
truth-seeking into power-mongering. Worse still, like the apostate angels who are 
self-condemned to repetition of the same, we will never learn a new thing.  
Orthodoxy was of course a problem for Milton too, and those critics who 
take Milton as their subject would always do well to consult the author on the 
question of intellectual inquiry. In 1667, when Paradise Lost was first published, 
Milton was mostly known as a Cromwellian apparachik, an apologist for regicide as 
well as the crass debunker of “the king’s book,” Eikon Basilike; moreover, rumor 
apparently had it that he was a bigamist. Such notoriety was sufficient at the 
Restoration to secure his (temporary) arrest and to raise questions about the 
decision not to except him from the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion. From what 
we can tell, Milton was eccentric even from his Cambridge days, when he refused 
ordination in favor of a self-ordained plan of study whose fruits never cease to 
amaze. Later of course, he became a full-blown rebel against church and state, and 
from time to time, an outlaw, depending on whom was in charge. This fact has 
figured in Milton studies by his being Satanized in the Romantic fashion, which 
because Milton is himself a god of the English literary canon, has always lent that 
critical turn to the Dark Side a certain frisson, as it does the not-dissimilar activity 
of figuring out new ways to deflate his huge poetic afflatus.  
But in his lifetime, being John Milton did not mean being on top. As a 
controversialist in the early 1640s, Milton was without much authority—too 
young, too obscure, too left field. Nonetheless, his tracts managed to scandalize 
one party or another: first, the bishops and their supporters, then parliament and 
the Presbyterians, after that monarchists both national and international, not to 
mention public sentiment on the eve of monarchy’s and Anglicanism’s restoration, 
and in 1673 with his last tract, Gilbert Sheldon’s resettled church, the Cavalier 
parliament and no doubt the king too—that is, in the unlikely event that it was 
read by any of them. But once Paradise Lost was discovered by the Duke of Dorset, 
browsing among the booksellers’ stalls in Little Britain as legend has it, the poem’s 
sudden emergence was greeted as if it were the birth of Athena from the head of 
Zeus, at least by the cognoscenti of the new regime. The rapt enthusiasm with which 
Dryden celebrates Milton’s achievement is indicative:  
Three poets, in three distant ages born,  
Greece, Italy, and England did adorn.  
The first in loftiness of thought surpass’d,  
The next in majesty, in both the last:  
The force of Nature could no farther go;  








If no Byronic frenzy greeted his new eminence, Milton’s audacity in 
picturing (as they saw it) the one true God did shock some, who considered the 
poem blasphemous on that count and others, inasmuch as Paradise Lost was 
figuratively populated with all the poet’s Christian heresies, including the most 
heinous at that or any other time, antitrinitarianism (Christian Doctrine, his 
theological treatise, no doubt went unpublished because the 1662 Act of 
Uniformity criminalized Socinianism, the catch-word for that heresy). But his 
fellow scribblers saw to it that Milton’s sudden eminence was perpetuated—
Addison especially, who made himself the impresario of Miltoniana—until 
Milton’s literary stature and his own Tory politics compelled Dr. Johnson to put 
poet and poem in their proper place, this time as a palinode in which Sin erupts 
out of Milton’s republican egotism. The rest, as they say, is history, with the battle 
well joined between lovers and haters of the poet, with some of both persuasions 
in Milton studies. At a conference some years ago, where I delivered a paper on 
defamation in Milton’s anti-prelatical tracts, I had the peculiar felicity of a 
distinguished scholar pronouncing at its end that my subject was a regicide, a 
murderer and a libeller, whom he implied nothing could redeem. But one doesn’t 
have to be royalist and Anglican, or a Restoration scholar, to detest the poet: as I 
said, recent generations of Miltonists, brought up on the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, have made it a critical sport to catch their subject out in his neuroses, 
logical contradictions and ideological lapses—like Dr. Johnson, exposing the idol’s 
feet of clay.  
But then, which of us is perfect? I am myself no stranger to controversy 
in Milton studies, which is one reason why Will solicited my response to the fine 
essays assembled for this issue of Early Modern Culture on “queering Milton.” 
Indeed, a couple of students informed me (I am not currently working in the field) 
that a Miltonist of note evidently found my own reading of the subject so 
objectionable that he declared in a footnote that he would not deign to consider 
it. Since being thus excepted could pique the reader’s interest, I should thank him, 
as he should thank me for moving him to set the record straight as he sees it. 
However, Will’s trepidation in the face of the Milton establishment, which to my 
certain knowledge is far from monolithic, does give me pause, along with student 
reports from the front, by which I mean the Milton list-serv whose bouts of 
incivility place it right up there with World of Warcraft as a model of intellectual 
engagement. But while there are certainly a few in the field who relish what Milton 
euphemistically called “the wars of Truth,” bad manners and closed minds are 
hardly unique to Milton studies; and in the poet’s own day, intellectual controversy 
could reach heights of abuse for the most part undreamed of in our academy. And 
it must be confessed that the aggressiveness that obtains and is even celebrated in 
some academic quarters can derive from a sense of the urgency and importance 
of the questions in hand, no doubt aggravated by the perpetual gap between 
human aspiration and human means (or what’s a heaven for?).  
Whether adequately or not, Milton defended his own infamously “tart 
rhetoric” on such grounds, seeing himself engaged in matters which, while 
irreducibly interpretive, were nonetheless of the greatest moment. But except 







politicians, the media and the rest of campus, the larger world remains perfectly 
indifferent to literary criticism, whose activity and purposes it neither understands 
nor values. From such a vantage, our wars cannot but appear petty and ourselves 
ridiculous. At the same time, we must not acquiesce in our trivialization: Milton 
did not, whose artistic stature was always impending until his final decade, and 
whose personal (as against Cromwellian) tracts do not seem to have risen above 
the generality of the pamphlet wars, with the negative exception of The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce (1644). But soon enough, they were recalled and read at other 
“revolutions”—in 1689, 1776 and 1789—and not only by Whigs and Romantics. 
They are now anthologized along with those of key republicans and dissenters, 
and even noticed by some political historians.  
And yet Milton and his controversial writings were judged ridiculous, even 
unconscionable, and as he himself pointed out, usually by those whose received 
authority or incumbency led them to suppose that God fought for them. But 
despite an egotism infinitely more justifiable than his opponents’ or indeed any 
Milton critic’s, and his sometimes indecorous zeal on behalf of the Good Old 
Cause, I sincerely doubt Milton believed God spoke to him in the night watches, 
or in any other than the usual way—through scripture—although it was regularly 
inferred from occasional passages in the tracts and of course the proems of Paradise 
Lost that he did. Owing to their religious and presumptively metaphysical nature, 
as I mentioned, his poetic expressions have been assigned a peculiar literality by 
some readers; but this inclination to literalism is also the fault of his own penchant 
for autobiographical excursus in the tracts—a defense against the ad hominem 
polemics of the day, or put another way, an abiding hunger to be recognized in his 
own terms. Because that recognition did not come until he probably knew its 
dubious value, Milton saw the human experience of deity and truth as interpretive, 
moral and historical, which is to say, conditional upon the evidence of scriptural 
expression, the integrity of each person’s understanding and choice, and the flux 
of circumstance with which he believed divine providence surrounds us for a 
purpose.  
I have argued that this is the invariable predicament of human faith in an 
insuperably hidden God, to which the Hebrew and Christian scriptures as well as 
the Protestant reformers return again and again, not to mention the Miltonic “I” 
who must regularly make that recognition in one form or another, and to which it 
must accommodate its all-too-human desires as Milton found himself obliged to 
do, both early and late. It is also the ordinary predicament of human knowledge, 
where we believe much and (in the philosophical sense) know little. Milton is no 
biblicist: he acknowledges the corrupt transmission of scripture (the Christian 
texts especially), and the difficulties posed by scriptural locutions more generally—
the  “hard places” on which he declines to build, focusing instead on what is clearly 
if not always positively expressed. As early as the Prolusions, he conspicuously 
adopted a Baconian skepticism about the untrammelled workings of the human 
mind (usually of the scholastic and metaphysical persuasion): indeed, Bacon’s idols 
and Milton’s idolatry share this same deluded source, which in its operations tends 
to mistake the specious for the real, the received and familiar for the right and 







But he also combined such skepticism with Bacon’s exuberant sense of human 
possibility—that is, once such idolatrous tendencies were recognized and 
contained by an apt and conscientious organon or method of inquiry.  
As I see it, method for Milton meant the adoption and observance of 
what amounts to an imminent, rhetorically-sensitive hermeneutic—the 
“grammatical-historical” method of exegesis, which was not original to him but to 
the rise of early modern humanism. Its northern cynosure was Erasmus, from 
whom, ironically, Luther learned about the Hebrew genitive and thereby 
justification sola gratia, sola fides, sola scriptura, which in large measure begat the 
Protestant Reformation. As Milton himself describes them in Christian Doctrine, the 
exegetical criteria for valid inference are  
linguistic ability, knowledge of the original sources, 
consideration of the overall intent, distinction between 
literal and figurative language, examination of the causes 
and circumstances, and of what comes before and after the 
passage in question, and comparison of one text with 
another. It must always be asked, too, how far the 
interpretation is in agreement with faith. Finally, one often 
has to take into account the anomalies of syntax, as, for 
example, when a relative does not refer to its immediate 
antecedent but to the principle word in the sentences, 
although it is not so near it. . . . Lastly, no inferences should 
be made from the text, unless they follow necessarily from 
what is written. This precaution is necessary, otherwise we 
may be forced to believe something which is not written 
instead of something which is, and to accept human 
reasoning, generally fallacious, instead of divine doctrine, 
thus mistaking the shadow for the substance. What we are 
obliged to believe are the things written in the sacred books, 
not the things debated in academic gatherings. (YP 6:582-
83)  
In short, Miltonic exegesis conceived the divine word not as transcendent but as 
incarnate, embedded like human beings themselves in the maze of lived as against 
speculative circumstance, right down to the operations of syntax. As he argues in 
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, exegesis is itself equitable speech that resolves 
the anomalous or exceptional expression by attending to the context of 
utterance—“what comes before and after the passage in question”: for “there is 
scarce any one saying in the Gospel, but must be read with limitations and 
distinctions, to be rightly understood . . . .which requires a skilfull and laborious 
gatherer [to] compare the words he finds, with other precepts, with the end of 
every ordinance, and with the general analogy of Evangelick doctrine.” 
“Otherwise,” Milton observes, “many particular sayings would be but strange 







Thus Milton resists both a crude and a metaphysical literalism, the first 
confining scriptural expression to its merely ostensible or superficial sense, the 
second converting figurative speech into symbols of supernatural entities (the 
source of Trinitarianism in Milton’s view). In either case, a failure to consider 
variations in usage denies the fact that neither speech nor its speakers can escape 
the human condition, whose intelligibility is embodied in particular experiences, 
occasions, desires and needs. Yet if exegesis should not stray from the natural or 
grammatical force of scriptural expressions—should not concoct or impose a 
semantic order for its books that lacks an evidentiary basis—Milton’s rhetorical 
emphasis on “the overall intent” recognizes the complex configuration of motives, 
“causes and circumstances,” which inform anything we say or do. And he 
practiced this equitable method with considerable insight and such scrupulous care 
that while it was the singular source of his heterodoxy, his readings of the scriptural 
text still stand up. But because he admits the ordinary contingencies of existence, 
Milton has been accused of illogic and expedience, although at this late date we 
should know that the formalities of logic and the so-called “laws of thought” 
pertain to a specific disciplinary use of language that is performed in philosophy 
departments, and which (as Wittgenstein observed decades ago, Hobbes in the 
seventeenth century, and rhetoricians a couple of millenia earlier) bears little 
resemblance to how we actually use and make sense of words.  
These charges are usually made where it is presumed that Milton has a 
personal ax to grind, with his invocation in that tract of “charity” and “equity” 
mistakenly made self-serving when these values are long-standing principles of 
interpretation in theology and law, both exegetical disciplines which argue against 
strictum jus—the obtuse expectation that the meaning of human speech and action 
is general and unconditioned, like logic itself proposes to be. Although scripture 
in Milton’s view has a single sense, the gospel or kerygma announcing Jesus as the 
Christ, he was not so zany as to suppose that recourse to method would somehow 
produce in every mind an identical reading, much less a univocal doctrine in all 
matters; nor was that a desideratum of his faith. Reasonable inference, well-
grounded in the text, was desirable, while coercion in pursuit of even outward 
uniformity—the policy of every regime under which he lived (however moderated 
under the Protectorate)—was anathema to him. If forcible conformity in religion 
preceded the reformation in England, it also ensued from it—the Henrician 
settlement having made church and state constitutionally one, thereby turning 
religious dissent into sedition and treason where before it had been heresy (the 
punishment was capital either way). Furthermore, especially under Elizabeth and 
James, conformity to the state church was popularly regarded as patriotic, which 
is why Milton’s express tolerance for sectarianism in the tracts makes him, if not 
unique, then notable; and this was not only because he had become a sect unto 
himself.  
For one thing, as a Protestant, he persisted despite many disappointments 
in thinking that humanity is educable; moreover, unlike the Erastian Luther or the 
theocratic Calvin, he felt that the principle of Christian liberty ought to have public 
as well as private consequences; and however mistakenly in the event, he put his 







Reformation. Moreover, he was also a member of the Cromwellian government, 
who by his own account chose to lose his remaining eyesight in order to write his 
first Defense of the English People, which hardly suggests the transcendental turn or 
antinomian paralysis ascribed to him. Nor is the appropriate comparison here with 
democratic radicals like Lilburne, Overton and Walwyn, next to whom his 
liberalism may appear weak-kneed. It should be with the beliefs which commonly 
governed seventeenth-century politics, whether a Presbyterian commonwealth or 
the restored monarchy.  
As any number of historians have pointed out, the greatest of these was 
“order,” simply because its achievement was felt—accurately or not—to be the 
most important, the most fragile and, as represented by the rule of law, a less 
pervasive aspect of early modern English life. From this angle, Milton’s constant 
extenuation over two decades for civil and religious tumult and change, including 
civil war, the overthrow of the English constitution, and the king’s judicial 
execution, is truly audacious (and it would have been more dangerous if more 
people had read him). The conditions he regarded as necessary and inevitable to 
the vital work of reform looked to the majority of the nation like a world grown 
suddenly unrecognizable and repulsive—capricious, discordant, perverse, the 
world famously “turned upside down.” But then, as Milton reminds us, what 
custom or orthodoxy inclines us to take for truth can lead to our outlawing the 
real thing; for “if it comes to prohibiting, there is not ought more likely to be 
prohibited than truth it self; whose first appearance to our eyes blear’d and dimm’d 
with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unplausible than many errors” 
(YP 2:565).  
In that final tract to which I referred, Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, 
Toleration (1673), he sought (culpably in our view) to exploit for Protestant 
dissenters the tactical advantage offered by a national outburst of “anti-popery,” 
consequent upon Charles’ Declaration of Indulgence (1672), which had just been 
rescinded by the king in the face of implacable opposition from the Cavalier 
parliament. Ostensibly, the Indulgence sought to ease the lot of all nonconformists 
which had been rendered still more painful and abject by the second Conventicles 
Act of 1670, whose new severity Marvell memorably termed “the quintessence of 
arbitrary malice.” Moreover, Charles was about to embark on a second war with 
the Dutch, and his ministers (the infamous Cabal) thought by the Indulgence to 
pacify the homefront, murmuring under an increasingly heavy tax burden. But 
unfortunately, the Dutch were Protestants with an exceedingly active printing 
industry (of which both English intellectual and religious dissenters had long 
availed themselves), while the government had allied itself with Catholic France, a 
fact with which the Dutch made great play in their propaganda. Given the general 
virulence of English “anti-popery” and a growing distrust of their king among the 
voting classes, the Declaration was popularly taken as an attempt by a crypto-
Catholic to rescue the legal position of his co-religionists. But Charles’ government 
would also seem to have had a larger legal aim, as parliament contended in its 
replies to the king; and that was to assert in the best Stuart fashion the royal 
prerogative, in effect testing the suspending and dispensing powers which arguably 







a move that could be and was seen as a possible first step towards reestablishing 
Roman Catholicism in England (in exchange for subsidy, Charles had just 
promised Louis as much in the Secret Treaty of Dover of 1670, although evidently 
without any immediate intention of fulfilling his commitment).  
Since Milton shared the patriotic English aversion to “popery,” he 
rejected the proffered Indulgence owing to its arguably unconstitutional means 
(Bunyan would do the same with James’ less problematical Declarations in 1687 
and 1688, which William Penn for his part would embrace, earning odium for 
himself in most of the dissenting community). However, as Keith Stavely argues, 
Milton evidently hoped the “no popery” agitation would result in a compensatory 
bill, then under discussion in committee, limiting the penal measures against 
dissenters in the name of Protestant unity. To promote that bill, which eventually 
died with the session in the House of Lords, he wrote this patently polemical tract, 
True Religion, but to no avail because Charles, faced with signs of what would 
become Exclusionist sentiment, prorogued parliament. However, the session did 
produce the first Test Act banning Catholics from political office of any kind, 
whose oath of allegiance, now denying the Tridentine dogma of 
transubstantiation, exposed by default the Catholicism of the Duke of York, Lord 
Admiral, and Charles’ treasurer, Lord Clifford, who privately resigned their 
offices—if not their integrity.  
Between his animadversions on “the common adversary” (YP 8:420), 
“the Papal Anti- christian Church” and what he regards as its habitual idolatry (YP 
8:434), Milton surveys the doctrines of the various Protestant denominations—
“Lutherans, Calvinists, Anabaptists, Socinians, Arminians” but tellingly not 
Quakers—having declared at the outset against “the Papist” that “All these may 
have some errors, but are no heretics” (YP 8:423). It is a distinction frequently 
observed by those writers and politicians who promoted liberty of conscience for 
all, and, as Blair Worden has argued, constituted government policy under the 
Protectorate, which the Calendar of State Papers Domestic shows in action. But 
in a strictly legal sense, he can say this because heresy was no longer a crime in 
England—Elizabeth’s Act of Uniformity (1559) having once again repealed the 
medieval statutes revived by Mary Tudor. Moreover, in 1677, perhaps out of the 
mixed motives which gave Milton his brief hope, the same parliament that devised 
the Clarendon Code and issued the Test Act would abolish the last relic of heresy 
legislation—the writ de heretico comburendo, unused since 1612 when it was issued to 
burn two Anabaptists under the personal supervision of James I (Browning 8:400). 
So Milton can fairly claim that “Popery is the only or the greatest Heresie” extant 
in Christendom, “and he who is so forward to brand all others for Hereticks, the 
obstinate Papist, the only Heretick” (YP 8:421), insofar as the papacy demanded 
the complete, unreflective submission of faith to “a Religion taken up and 
believe’d from the traditions of men and additions to the word of God” (YP 
8:421), which is heresy in Milton’s definition.  
What True Religion scathingly calls “the growth of this Romish weed” had 
in the past usually exercised Milton’s pen only when he lambasted Anglican or 
Presbyterian churches for perpetuating the relics of “popish” practices (prelacy, 







and censorship) (YP 8:417). But here he does not (only) tar both with a popish 
brush, but draws the Reformers’ fundamental distinction on behalf of toleration: 
Roman Catholicism “permits not her Laity to read the Bible in their own tongue” 
(YP 8:434) and, by a range of further interdictions, prohibits the active inquiry 
made possible at least in theory when the Henrician settlement placed the Great 
Bible in every parish (it should be noted that the medieval heresy statutes and one 
of Henry’s own were still in force at the time, since Henry himself purposed no 
change in the English church from Catholic doctrine or worship). By contrast, 
Milton defines Protestants as those who recognize two fundamental principles, 
namely, “that the Rule of true Religion is the Word of God only; and that their 
Faith ought not to be an implicit faith” (YP 8:420), that is, it should be understood 
as well as believed:  
Heresie is in the Will and choice profestly against Scripture; 
error is against the Will, in misunderstanding the Scripture 
after all sincere endeavours to understand it rightly: Hence 
it was said well by one of the Ancients, Err I may, but a 
Heretick I will not be. It is a humane frailty to err, and no man 
is infallible here on earth. But so long as all these profess to 
set the Word of God only before them as the Rule of faith 
and obedience; and use all diligence and sincerity of heart, 
by reading, by learning, by study, by prayer for Illumination 
of the Holy Spirit, to understand the Rule and obey it, they 
have done what man can do: God will assuredly pardon 
them, as he did the friends of Job; good and pious men, 
though much mistaken, as there it appears, in some points 
of doctrine. (YP 8:423-24)  
Milton’s point here—and my own as a literary critic—is that there is no 
heresy wherever an effort is made to understand and elucidate the text which, God 
“having made no man infallible” (including the pope), is “what man can do” (YP 
8:424). Interpretation is a matter of probabilities, not certainties. Thus to exact 
from others unwavering adherence to received opinion, usually in adiaphora or 
“things indifferent” and therefore inessential to salvation, is a far greater abuse of 
faith than permitting disagreement over what should in fact be left elective, free 
of merely human impositions in the form of “a command or a Prohibition, and so 
consequently an addition to the word of God” (YP 8:428). “Besides,” Milton 
observes, “how unequal, how uncharitable must it needs be, to Impose that which 
his conscience cannot urge him to impose, upon him whose conscience forbids 
him to obey?” (YP 8:428). In a fugue of erotema, Milton pursues this problem of 
arbitrary and self-aggrandizing authority in matters where no certainty can be had, 
demanding of the reader: “If he who thinks himself in the truth professes to have 
learnt it, not by implicit faith, but by attentive study of the Scriptures & full 
perswasion of heart, with what equity can he refuse to hear or read him, who 







assert truth by arrogating to himself the only freedome of speech, and stoping the 
mouths of others equally gifted?” (YP 8:436).  
Equity or fairness means charitable allowance and equal right to an 
unburdened conscience and to opinions freely expressed—in a word, toleration, 
which Milton was brave to use. For “What Protestant then who himself maintains 
the same Principles, and disavowes all implicit Faith, would persecute, and not 
rather charitably tolerate such men as these, unless he mean to abjure the 
Principles of his own Religion?” (YP 8:426). Erotema are conspicuous in True 
Religion and not just because Milton feels the urgency of the moment and the issue 
he has in hand. He intends with each rhetorical question to pose home truths, to 
interrogate the reader’s conscience—to challenge us to admit the inferences he 
successively draws from the tract’s definition of heresy and what are taken to be 
Protestant first principles by the various denominations who subscribe to that title. 
The originally geometrical maxim he invokes (and calls logical)—“against them who 
deny Principles, we are not to dispute” (YP 8:432)—pertains to more than the futility of 
arguing with those who do not share our assumptions, namely, Roman Catholics 
who refuse to acknowledge scripture as the sole and proper source of Christian 
knowledge. Its invocation here signals what Milton’s polemic may disguise, that 
the argument for toleration in True Religion should have the force of deductive 
necessity for anyone who claims to be a Protestant.  
The problem, as he knew from experience, is that both Anglicans and 
Presbyterians, while professing to accept these Protestant principles, pervert them 
by admitting political imperatives extraneous to ecclesiastical concerns. However 
intelligible given the early modern concern for “order,” or legally justifiable given 
the constitutional identity of church and state in English law, uniformity of 
religious observance is just such a political perversion (paradoxically justified by 
the claim that what was “inessential” or “indifferent” left government free to 
legislate in that arena). But it is cruel and inhumane nonsense—Marvell’s “arbitrary 
malice”—when considered from the vantage of faith in what Luther calls res non 
apparentes, things which do not appear as such. Milton goes on to define the extent 
of this toleration and the exercise of Christian liberty by English subjects, “as being 
all Protestants, that is on all occasions to give account of their Faith, either by 
Arguing, Preaching in their several Assemblies, Publick writing, and the freedom 
of Printing” (YP 8:426).  
Invoking Paul in Thessalonians, he asks “How shall we prove all things, 
which includes all opinions at least founded on Scripture, unless we not only 
tolerate them, but patiently hear them, and seriously read them?” (YP 8:436). What 
Stavely mistakenly regards as an originally Latitudinarian distinction between 
involuntary error and willful heresy Milton had argued since the 1640s and The 
Reason of Church Government (1642), where he represents the rise of Protestant 
sectarianism in England as a necessary, refining contest between truth and error, 
an agon which the nation, like Samson, should undergo if it would be open to the 
reforming hand of divine providence. To this extent, the tracts consistently 
propound a restrictive antinomianism that seeks to remove whatever obstacles—







of church and state—whose effect is to constrain Christian liberty and stand in 
the way of God’s revelation to the English people, “being all Protestants.”  
This last stipulation, and his strictures against Roman Catholic worship 
and devotion as “idolatrous,” can be taken as a show of bigotry, or at least a 
demagogic blot on Milton’s liberal scutcheon. However, we do well to remember 
that the charge of heresy was first levelled by the papacy, which excommunicated 
Henry and then Edward, rested with Mary’s brief spell of auto de fe, and then paused 
in order to take the measure of Elizabeth’s regime. Having done so to his 
satisfaction Pius V issued the Bull Regnans in excelsis in 1570, denouncing Elizabeth 
as “a heretic and favourer of heretics,” excommunicating her and absolving her 
subjects of their obedience, so as to prepare the way for the queen’s ultimate 
assassination (Elton 427). When combined with Mary Stuart’s arrival incontinent 
from Scotland in 1568, as Catholic Europe’s great white hope; the immense 
pressure exerted by the Jesuit missionary movement, begun in 1577; the chronic 
arrival on British shores of the Spanish Armada from 1588 on, and Spain’s war 
with the Protestant Netherlands, the English public came to regard Roman 
Catholicism not as a Christian faith or even a church but as “popery” and a hostile 
polity. And then there was “Treason’s Masterpeece,” the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 
to assassinate James and parliament together, devised by a handful of English 
Catholics whose overthrow inspired the Observance of the Fifth of November or 
“Thanksgiving” Act in 1606, with its fireworks, bonfires and burning of popes in 
effigy.  
Owing to what he describes as the papacy’s habit of international 
aggression but more particularly its internal policy of violence against dissent, 
Milton shares that prejudice but on the principle that “Ecclesiastical is ever 
pretended to Political”—a pretension as Anglican as it was papal, although he is 
careful not to say so here (YP 8:429):  
 
The Pope by this mixt faculty, pretends right to Kingdoms 
and States, and especially to this of England, Thrones and 
Unthrones Kings, and absolves the people from their 
obedience to them; sometimes interdicts to whole Nations 
the Publick worship of God, shutting up their Churches: 
and was wont to dreign away greatest part of the wealth of 
this then miserable Land, as part of his Patrimony, to 
maintain the Pride and Luxury of his Court and Prelates, 
and now since, through the infinite mercy and favour of 
God, we have shaken off his Babylonish Yoke, hath not 
ceas’d by his Spyes and Agents, Bulls and Emissaries, once 
to destroy both King and Parliament; perpetually to seduce, 
corrupt, and pervert as many as they can of the People. 
Whether therefore it be fit or reasonable, to tolerate men 
thus principl’d in Religion towards the State, I submit it to 
the consideration of all Magistrates, who are best able to 








With this final gesture at the Cavalier parliament—itself the implacable foe of 
English dissent—Milton makes clear that the true idol of Roman Catholicism is 
the pope and his claim of infallibility, to which A Treatise of Civil Power (1659) amply 
attests in its argument for the separation of church and state, ecclesiastical from 
political jurisdictions. It is on the grounds of such idolatry that he affirms the 
English response to the papal bull damning Elizabeth—the 1571 Act (13 Elizabeth 
I c.2) “against the bringing in and putting in execution of bulls and other 
instruments from the see of Rome” (Elton 428). The statute was intended not only 
to prohibit the publishing of Regnan in excelsis in England, but also as a kind of 
symbolic equivalent to the Act of Supremacy’s assertion of praemunire—the 
monarch’s exclusive legal jurisdiction in his or her regality. It achieves this by 
prohibiting the importation of all religious paraphernalia carrying the pope’s 
blessing and therewith his authority: “any token or tokens, thing or things, called 
by the name of an Agnus Dei, or any crosses, pictures, beads or suchlike vain and 
superstitious from the bishop or see of Rome, or from any person or persons 
authorised or claiming authority by or from the said bishop or see of Rome to 
consecrate or hallow the same” (Elton 431).  
Like the rest of Elizabethan “anti-popery” legislation, the purpose of 
whose savagery was apparently deterrence since it was erratically enforced except 
against Jesuits and priests, this statute was still on the books a hundred years later, 
and for the same reasons which told against the Declaration of Indulgence in 1673 
and again in 1688—fear that a Catholic king would reestablish that religion and 
papal jurisdiction in England. If the effect of the Tudor bill was to deprive Roman 
Catholics of any new articles of devotion and worship (and what they had were 
later subject to confiscation under the still more egregious 1593 Act for “securing 
the Queen’s subjects in obedience” [35 Elizabeth 1 c.2]), it was only implemented 
during political panics like this one in 1673. Unfortunately, with the Declaration 
of Indulgence and the Test Act, which revealed in quick succession that James had 
not only converted to Rome but was about to wed Mary of Modena, a Catholic 
princess, the nation’s combustible prejudices were fully ignited: “On 5 November 
[1673], there were more bonfires and more popes burnt in effigy than there had 
been for thirty years,” John Miller reports (Miller 131).  
No doubt during the Commonwealth, his nation had in Milton’s view 
once more shaken off the Babylonian yoke of prelacy and the magistrate’s coercive 
power in religion, only to have the Presbyterians reimpose it in another form, and 
the Protectorate remove it again, until the Restoration when it was yet once more 
reestablished. But for the same politic reasons that lead him to invoke the Thirty-
Nine Articles and the prudence of magistracy, much goes unsaid in True Religion. 
The advice it gives for rooting out the “Romish weed” is all but straightforwardly 
advice for reforming religious policy: first, “to read duly and diligently the Holy 
Scriptures,” since the neglect of such study leads to “implicit faith, ever learning 
and never taught, much hearing and small proficience, till want of Fundamental 
knowledg easily turns to superstition and Popery” (YP 8:433-34). Next, to extend 
a national policy of tolerance towards other Protestant sects, including “freedome 
of speech,” for “no Learned man but will confess he hath much profited by 







he holds more firmly establish’t” (YP 8:437). And finally, “to amend our lives,” 
which notoriously in the reign of “the merry monarch” (an epithet always invoked 
by historians in this context) had  “grown more numerously and excessively vitious 
than heretofore; Pride, Luxury, Drunkenness, Whoredom, Cursing, Swearing, 
bold and open Atheism every where abounding” (YP 8:438). There is also, as 
Stavely remarks, the unmistakable hint that God is already punishing England for 
its copious immorality by “Pestilence, Fire, Sword and Famin” (YP 8:439), in the 
shape of the great plague of 1665, the great fire of London in 1666, and the defeats 
suffered in Charles’ first war against the Dutch, on the tremulous eve of that war’s 
renewal.  
Yet in the midst of the anti-popish hysteria which True Religion does 
nothing to abate, Milton nonetheless extends to Roman Catholics the same 
immunity from coercive civil measures for which he argues in the case of 
Protestants: “Are we to punish them by corporal punishment, or fines in their 
Estates, upon account of their Religion? I suppose it stands not with the Clemency 
of the Gospel, more then what appertains to the security of the State” (YP 8:431). 
In short, he rejects the core of Elizabethan recusancy legislation—the model for 
the Clarendon Code—which fined, on an escalating scale that became ever more 
insupportable, those recusants from Anglican worship who attended 
nonconformist services on Sundays, whether Protestant or Catholic, issuing writs 
of praemunire (which meant the loss of all property and indefinite imprisonment) 
against whomever openly displayed their religious dissent. Since he lived under a 
regime that, since the Interregnum’s end, insisted in Halifax’s famous phrase that 
“It is impossible that a Dissenter should not be a Rebel,” historical precedent is 
not always Milton’s friend. Yet if his syntactical show of reluctance (“I suppose”) 
is as politic as his Anglican (or simply English) “our,” few dissenting tracts at the 
time made the same concession since all were united against the common 
papistical foe.  
In fact, neither his conventional charges of Catholic heresy and idolatry, 
nor his expedient placation of Anglicanism and the Cavalier parliament, express 
the heart of Milton’s matter: both are tactics adopted for the occasion and his 
would-be audience, and to focus upon them is to miss the tract’s central point, 
which is to be found in its most powerful figure—that of Jesus’ seamless tunic, 
“woven from top to bottom,” which moved the soldiers who had crucified him 
to cast lots for the whole garment, rather than tear it into four parts, “one for each 
soldier” (John 19:23). On the face of it, there are few better images of religious 
unity or at least outward uniformity than this analogy; but for Milton it is an odd 
choice. In The Reason of Church Government, he compares ecclesiastical “discipline” 
on earth and in heaven to the baroque image (shortly to be superseded) of 
planetary epicycles, in which each cosmic body executes intermediate circles 
within its larger orbit (vide Adam’s inquiries of Raphael). Thus, he suggests, church 
discipline may orb “it self into a thousand vagancies of glory and delight, and with 
a kinde of eccentricall equation be as it were an invariable Planet of joy and felicity” 
(YP 1:752). Then there is Areopagitica’s “Temple of the Lord” which simply defies 
the delusion of inseparable uniformity in the church; for “when every stone is laid 







this world; neither can every peece of the building be of one form; nay rather the 
perfection consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly 
dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional arises the goodly and the gracefull 
symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure” (YP 2:555).  
As these instances predict, Milton takes the image of Jesus’ seamless tunic, 
which had evidently been used to justify such religious conformity, and makes it 
his own: “It is written that the Coat of our Saviour was without seame: whence 
some would infer that there should be no division in the Church of Christ. Yet 
seams in the same cloath, neither hurt the garment, nor misbecome it; and not 
only seams, but Schisms will be while men are fallible. . . .” (YP 8:436) “Seames” 
belong to our finite and fallible condition, not the idealism of those unnamed 
polemicists who took the circumstance of Jesus’ woven tunic and converted it 
willy-nilly into a symbol of lockstep religion, without regard for “limitations and 
distinctions.” Milton chooses not to argue the exegetical point; instead, he rejects 
what he terms in Areopagitica the “irrational” demand for seamless continuity in 
any human artifact. In this world, seams “neither hurt the garment, nor misbecome 
it,” anymore than contiguity or eccentricity necessarily compromise perfection or 
joy, which brings me back to the question of what it means to “queer” Milton.  
The answer depends to some extent on whose Milton: more often than 
not, the poet and polemicist is known by the constructions we critics place on the 
texts which bear his name. In the last fifty years or so, this Milton has been some 
version of rationalist or irrationalist, or both at once. But his writings remain far 
richer than any of the categories we use to describe them: when I am teaching 
Milton, and I go back to any work and read it from end to end, I see things that I 
have forgotten or never saw in the first place; and they are things that do not admit 
of simple assimilation to “my” Milton—grist for my peculiar critical mill. They 
require me to stop and think again, always marveling at his art, always astonished 
at its methodical detail. It is this sense of Milton’s method, I assume, that led 
Stanley Fish to entitle his book, “How Milton Works,” which he has gleefully 
described as thirty pages of telling and six hundred of showing. But does such an 
analytical mechanism, whose popularity remains undiminished after all these years, 
do complete justice to the possibilities of meaning in Milton’s texts, or to the range 
of our possible engagements with any human expression? After all, that is—
profoundly—why we read, and why literary critics continue to study John Milton.  
There are a number of reasons why I think “queering,” as these essays do 
it, has things to tell us, invisible seams we may not see or understand about 
Milton’s work, as David Orvis discloses in Doctrine and Discipline, where the myth 
of Anteros functions as a figure of queer desire that belies the overt heterosexuality 
of Miltonic marriage. Admittedly, what I am about to say reflects my own 
conception of the poet, his influences and his times; but there are many Milton 
critics, past and present, who have seen the things I have seen in his writings. 
“Queering” emphasizes what Milton does, namely, the great fact of creatural life—
embodiment—which deity honors with an immanent and then incarnate and 
always personal God. Indeed, for Milton, there can be no creatural knowledge of 
God or the world without embodiment, which serves as the threshold between 







monist thesis), nor are they necessarily antagonistic (the dualist thesis): rather, our 
experience of them entails a distinction—a seam between these contingent and 
inextricable modes of creatural being, whose operations are mutual but not the 
same. Self is created from the bodily experience which connects it to the world, 
but that experience is no more its objective correlative than the body’s appearances 
or the human conventions of identity.  
Milton makes this argument in the Second Defense, where he says that his 
body makes him a liar against his will since he does not look blind, and that both 
conscience and experience refute the accusation that his loss of sight was God’s 
condign punishment for writing against the king. But he was an apostle of 
incongruity long before his blindness, contending throughout the tracts that 
neither the experience of continuity nor totality belong to human being. To be a 
creature is to be embodied, mortal, finite, which for Milton constitutes the 
condition of our separateness, and of our needful sympathy with things which 
share the same bodily existence we do. He writes the tracts out of this awareness, 
as the figures of eccentricity and contiguity attest, which are equally the hallmarks 
of divine as well as human creativity. Incongruity is also the problem that besets 
his speakers from the companion poems to Lycidas, the sonnets, Samson and his 
two epics, who always find themselves at odds with their world. If it is true, as T.S. 
Eliot complains, that Milton does not feel his thought “as immediately as the 
odour of a rose” (Eliot 1 247); that his imagery is “all general,” lacking Donne’s 
or Shakespeare’s pungent particularity (Eliot 2 140); that “the inner meaning is 
separated from the surface, and tends to become something occult, or at least 
without effect upon the reader until fully understood” (Eliot 2 143), then the 
reasons lie for Milton in the “seam” or distinction between these inseparable 
modes of human being, mind and body, which find their way into his poetry in 
subtle and elusive ways.  
For Milton, it is an issue of idolatry at the level of poetic image and syntax, 
in which he would not have us absorbed in the way Eliot the Imagist desires, and 
first Satan and the apostate, then Eve and Adam do, to their great loss. To rest in 
unreflective sensation denies the distinction between mind and body, self and 
experience, the evident and inevident sense of things, what immediately appears 
and what proves in time to be the case, which constitutes an interlude of 
indefiniteness, uncertainty, contingency, in which assumption and expectation can 
be turned upside down. This is of course the temptation endured by Our Saviour, 
his mother and disciples in Paradise Regained, and the question raised by Samson’s 
inner promptings, even to the end. And as in queer theory, the distinction 
introduces aesthetic issues on which critics have commented since the publication 
of the late poetry, but which currently have gone by the board in Milton studies. 
Whether the reader is for or against Milton’s poetics, they can generally agree 
about its effects, as I can agree with Eliot’s familiar comments here while placing 
a construction on them that instead justifies Milton’s practice:  
 
In Milton there is always the maximal, never the minimal, 
alteration of ordinary language. Every distortion of 







foreign way or with the meaning of the foreign word from 
which it is derived rather than the accepted meaning in 
English, every idiosyncrasy is a particular act of violence 
which Milton has been the first to commit. There is no 
cliche, no poetic diction in the derogatory sense, but a 
perpetual sequence of original acts of lawlessness. Of all 
modern writers of verse, the nearest analogy seems to me to 
be Mallarme, a much smaller poet, though still a great one. 
(Eliot 2 154)  
 
We have forgotten what John Crowe Ransom, himself a poet like Eliot, 
said about Milton’s poetry, which he disliked: that it is deeply, deliberately 
experimental, which Eliot’s reference to Mallarme underscores. We tend to think 
the so-called “metaphysical” poets experimental; but as Eliot observes, in their 
conceitfulness they are not only recognizably linked to Donne but obviously and 
often explicitly to the Tudor Petrarchanists. Milton, however, is unique in his 
poetics, even inimitable because his imitators reproduce the superficies but not 
the effect of his words. As Dr. Johnson complains, he is as idiosyncratic as one 
can be in the English tradition, which Johnson puts down to his republicanism 
and hatred of authority. I will not rehearse this aspect of the Milton controversy, 
which Christopher Ricks has intelligently if not definitively handled; but since 
queer theory is itself inclined towards an aesthetic of incongruity, I would observe 
that Milton’s poetics share that inclination in a different if comparable fashion.  
It is a peculiarly allusive and analytic idiom, whose manifold—and I have 
argued, ironical—meanings are shaped and disclosed precisely by their deviation 
from those common usages and patterns of speech which Dr. Johnson, Eliot and 
others approve. But regardless, it is fidelity to the actual vicissitudes of human 
experience, in tension with just such assumptions and expectations, that 
configures the embodied self and makes poetry “simple, sensuous and passionate” 
for Milton. As early as the Third Prolusion, he argues this very Baconian point 
(made in both the Advancement and De Augmentis) against scholastic logic as a 
medium of knowledge, for which he would substitute the “sensible and plausible” 
speech of poetry, rhetoric and history. Those orders of expression possess the 
affective power to move the whole human being, not just the intellect, to 
understanding, decision and action, which for a public man like Milton proposes 
to be, is the proper means by which “to inculcate wisdom [and] to incite to noble 
acts” (YP 1:246). By contrast, the problems of scholastic philosophy “have no 
existence in reality at all, but like unreal ghosts and phantoms without substance 
obsess minds already disordered and empty of real wisdom,” contributing “neither 
to the general good nor to the honour and profit of our country, which is generally 
considered the supreme purpose of all sciences” (YP 1:245-46).  
Moreover, as with queering, the predicament of embodiment makes his 
poetry, and indeed all his writings including Christian Doctrine, acutely personal. If 
anyone does, Milton writes out of his experience, his private joys and sorrows, 
although the lyric ego is not his own but a self that must learn what the author 







poetry, but never its consumation. The very sense of the word “embodied” carries 
the force of a distinction (but no division) between self and its corporeal being, 
which queering also argues against identitarian claims and Milton expresses by 
Eve’s “unexperienced” displacement of her being onto its amorous reflection 
(LM:PL 4.457): she knows self solely as unreflective sensation and emotion, but 
remains ignorant of its source until the divine voice intercedes to tell her that what 
she admires and then adores is the body’s image of itself, with speech (as it often 
does in myth) separating self from undifferentiated experience. From this 
distinction arises that curious belief with which humanity is afflicted, namely, that 
we are made or rendered bodily, as if we had been otherwise, only to find our 
selves abruptly—and sometimes falsely—incarnated here. But as Adam describes 
his birth, we do so because consciousness awakes to the body and the world 
simultaneously: it learns the body as it learns the world to which sensation 
inextricably connects it. And as the body changes with each sensation, so the self 
grasps the contingency of creaturely existence and thereby the limit conditions of 
human being, subject both within and without to the body’s transformations.  
Thus Milton pictures the contingency of this vital relation between self 
and body in picturing how our first parents differently come to bodily awareness; 
and queering also understands that not everyone experiences embodiment in the 
same way. Despite the enthralling immediacy of our sensations and passions, the 
body does not necessarily feel like self or even part of self, especially when it forces 
its existence upon our consciousness by its demands or frailties. At that point, it 
seems antipathetic, estranging. To a certain extent, Samson’s crisis is not his 
bondage to the Philistines but his bondage to a body he no longer recognizes—
now blind and inert, an alien assemblage, Dagon’s mirror image, where it had once 
been glorious, seamless, miraculous in its strength. And without his familiar body, 
not to mention his hair, Samson has lost his familiar identity and relation to his 
God, which he fears may have been delusional all the while. He has also been 
displaced, not least by his enslavement, from the collective decorum of bodily 
being that his or any community assumes for its members, not only in appearance, 
movement and speech, but in the very feelings these express, as Uriel detects the 
presence of the fallen on earth when he spies Satan “disfigured, more than could 
befall / Spirit of happy sort” by his “gestures fierce” and “mad demeanor” (LM: 
PL 4.127-28). 
But sympathy for the devil is wasted here since the apostate are the 
incontinent conformists of Paradise Lost, and their great chief imperializing when 
it comes to identity, who invents the dogma of the angels’ autochthonous birth; 
who sees himself and his predicament reflected everywhere he looks; and whose 
drive for the self-identical would have everyone, including God, confined in 
doxological fashion to “mutual amity so strait, so close, / That I with you must 
dwell or you with me” (LM: PL 4.375-77). The problem with this plan is that deity 
is not as it appears to be, much to Satan’s hysterical dismay, who had supposed 
himself to be uniquely like God, only to discover at the exaltation that he was only 
like God’s firstborn creature and divine similitude, the Son. The weird fruit of this 
perceived demotion, Sin, produced out of Satan’s own narcissistic brain, comes so 







own image in a Miltonic satire on more than Satan’s titanic narcissism. For 
Milton’s devil is a rationalist who claims his reason notionally equalled the divine, 
if only by reducing deity to the sum of its palpable parts, and who “brings / a mind 
not to be changed by place or time” (LM: PL 1.253-54), declaring to himself and 
his followers the rationalist manifesto that “The mind is its own place, and in itself 
/ Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven” (LM: PL 1.252-53).  
Indeed, the creaturely attempt to escape bodily existence Milton treats as 
pathological and regularly ascribes to Satan, whose denial of his embodied 
condition is made actual in a way Marlowe would recognize, when the devil 
laments on Mt. Niphrates, “Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell” (LM: PL 4.75). 
I refer here to Milton’s persistent phenomenalism, in which the quality of one’s 
experience depends upon the mind that receives it, as Marlowe’s Faust discovers, 
which at the same time can be no less real for that contingency. Such is the 
symbiosis between body and mind. One of the reasons Satan undertakes his 
journey out of hell is because he thinks—until the moment when he arrives—that 
he can alter the condition of himself and his followers, a delusion that precipitates 
the Almighty’s first joke (“seest thou what rage / Transports our adversary” [LM: 
PL 3.80-81]), and Satan’s despair. For he cannot leave hell or change his state for 
the better: having rejected the source of life in his creator, he has deprived himself 
of the capacity to grow, learn and change, repent and convert, which attend the 
reasonable creature’s conscious, faithful relation to God. He and the apostate have 
thus consigned themselves forever to the state of the living dead, condemned to 
endless circularity and reiteration, whether in hell or the new world, and a 
landscape bereft of such possibilities—where “peace / And rest can never dwell, 
hope never comes / That comes to all” (LM: PL 1.65- 67).  
As everyone knows, Milton explores the predicament of his own 
blindness but also of his exceptionality in the figure of Samson, whose 
sightlessness is not only physical but spiritual; Satan in his solipsism is another 
such figure, as is the suffering speaker of Paradise Lost and of one of Milton’s 
greatest sonnets, “When I consider how my light is spent.” The conviction of 
being a person set apart, almost congenital to Milton’s writings, is not owing to a 
complacent superiority or a blind faith in the manifest destiny of his cause. It is 
evident that, at various junctures in his life, Milton experienced the world he 
believed governed by a just and good God as incoherent, inordinate, unjust. Such 
responses are very human; but the doubt they may inspire can lead to profound 
shifts in understanding, to adamant disbelief on the one hand, or to theodicy on 
the other—the vindication of God’s ways—which early became the chief 
problematic of Milton’s art. His peculiar sense of injustice, of incoherence, appears 
to consist in the felt discrepancy between his reception and his sense of self, 
specifically, the exceptional sensations of his own genius whose sheer power and 
celerity the proems of Paradise Lost express to some extent, and with whose 
capacities he kept faith by a lifetime of intellectual as well as artistic travail. The 
affinity with Samson needs no explanation, except to insist like Donne in Death’s 
Duel on the irreducible ambiguity of that biblical example.  
Milton experienced this discrepancy almost from the start (and certainly 







which undoubtedly made genius a burden as much as an afflatus. The burden was 
likely increased by the very eccentricity which makes his poetry strange, queer, and 
which appears to have been greeted with derision (“the Lady of Christ’s”) at 
Cambridge—derision to which his career as a controversialist amply exposed him. 
More to the point, his reception led Milton to fear that those powers of which he 
had the most intimate experience would prove not only unproductive, inevident, 
but ultimately illusory. For although he knew his genius from its sensations, it 
signified only a capacity, a potential, which however astonishing could remain 
forever inconsumate, thwarted by the consequences of his own choices—the work 
of his “left hand.” In his biography of the poet, William Parker mentions “the 
troubling sense of isolation that comes in time to the gifted” (Parker 1:7), and 
which inflects Milton’s repeated pleas for a fit audience, though few (LM: PL 7.31). 
This was no convention, nor are the autobiographical passages which dot his tracts 
the effusions of an overblown ego, for both of which he has been much ridiculed. 
They derive instead from an abiding anxiety to be known as he experienced 
himself, and not as he seemed, which again is a very human desire.  
When the speaker of Paradise Lost dreads that “an age too late, or cold / 
Climate, or years damp my intended wing / Depressed” and so rob his “higher 
argument” of its due fame, he confesses a similar fear, to which he adds the further 
aggravation, “and much they may, if all be mine, / Not hers who brings it nightly 
to my ear” (LM: PL 9.44-47). As it always has, the figure of the muse signifies an 
extraordinary access of imaginative power, which Milton by then surely knew he 
had; but here, in the context of fame, the muse is invoked to assuage the speaker’s 
anxiety about the reception of his art in a hostile world, with he himself “fallen on 
evil days, / On evil days though fallen, and evil tongues: / In darkness, and with 
dangers compassed round, / And solitude” (LM: PL 7.24-28). Those who mock 
Milton for the interregnum between his claims and his achievements also ignore 
his passionate political commitments, unless to depress them by observing that 
they produced the rule of Charles II, not the saints. But in reducing such 
expressions to an egotism resolutely oblivious to the popular failure of himself, 
his ideas and his cause, they betray the schadenfreude of those who resent genius, not 
having it themselves.  
But if Miltonic embodiment has its perplexities, it also has its raptures. 
Notwithstanding the dearth of that T.S. Eliot sought and could not find there, the 
world of Milton’s poetry is full of noises, sounds and sweet airs, voice and echoes; 
palpable, mutable atmospheres, winds and breezes; wafting fragrances, tastes, 
textures and touch; amber light and darkness visible (a paradox, not an oxymoron), 
as well as the access of instinct, emotion and idea these affections of the body 
incite in the minds which experience or imagine them. And none of this sensation 
is a mere backdrop to the action but methodically contributes to its distinctive 
qualities and significance. Moreover, heavenly beings in Paradise Lost are no less 
embodied than human ones because they are no less creatural. Thus Raphael 
proves to a bemused Adam—smitten by the archangel’s “glorious shape” (LM: 
PL 5.309), “whose excellence he saw / Transcend his own so far” (LM: PL 5.456-
57)—that star ladies like himself do indeed go the bathroom, which the archangel 







transubstantiate” his food in Milton’s satirical usage. As Raphael explains, both 
human and angelic being have  
 
Within them every lower faculty 
Of sense, whereby they hear, see, smell, touch, taste,  
Tasting concoct, digest, assimilate, 
And corporeal to incorporeal turn. . . . (LM: PL 5.409-15)  
 
For “whatever was created, needs / To be sustained and fed,” in a cosmic 
alimentary round from earth to sea, to air and fire, moon and sun (LM: PL 5.415-
30). Angelic sex can only be next.  
Thus the spectrum of creaturely existence pictured by the archangel in 
Book Five—inanimate, sentient, instinctual, reasonable and intelligential—knows 
no sharp divisions since all are made by God, who alone is absolutely other as 
creator distinguished from creature, unmade from made, causeless from caused, 
infinite from finite: “When we speak of knowing God, it must be understood with 
reference to the imperfect comprehension of man; for to know God as he really 
is, far transcends the power of man’s thought, much more of his perception [nam 
Deus, prout in se est humanam cogitationem, nedum sensus longe superat]” (CM 14:30-31). 
Milton’s Christian Doctrine begins with two seemingly contradictory principles—
God’s existence and God’s incomprehensibility—which work not to invalidate 
scripture’s account of deity but paradoxically to reinforce it, as the only authentic 
religious knowledge available and intelligible to humanity, not least because God 
himself has provided it.  
We are not, Milton says, to speculate about the divine nature but instead 
to conceive God as he “shows and describes himself in the sacred writings [qualem 
in sacris literiis ipse se exhibet, seque describit],” but with this critical proviso—that “he 
is not so constituted in himself, but of the sort we can grasp [non qualis in se est, sed 
qualem nos capere possumus]” (CM 14:30, my very literal translation). Milton 
deliberately refrains from using the Latin equivalents of “image,” “picture,” 
“form” or even “conception” to which Sumner and Kelley have recourse, much 
less their interpolated “corresponds.” His preference for verbs over nouns, and 
his use of the indefinite phrase, qualis . . . talem, make the iconoclastic point that, 
for us, deity is never an object for us to know, only a meaning for us to grasp. 
Similarly, the interpolated concept of correspondence suggests that scriptural 
expressions permit us to make a stable, discrete and intelligible correlation 
between the expressions of the text, as we understand them, and the divine nature. 
This was of course Job’s mistake, who assumed he could confine deity to the 
covenant’s picture of the Lord; thus the creator God’s theopany from the 
whirlwind obliges Job to confess that “I have uttered what I did not understand, 
/ things too wonderful for me, which I did not know” (Job 42:3). That is, in our 
human finitude, we simply cannot say how deity is as scripture depicts it, only that 
it is so.  
Thus those critics who have sought systematically, in the scholastic 
fashion, to organize Christian Doctrine’s account of the divine attributes inevitably 







(in his view) scripture itself does, and that includes whatever it leaves unsaid about 
the interrelations among its images. Like the Protestant reformers, he makes our 
knowledge of God, whom “we must call WONDERFUL and 
INCOMPREHENSIBLE,” effectively groundless (YP 6:152)—a matter of faith. 
So if we want to know the unknowable God, we should think of the divine as 
scripture speaks of it, but without supposing that its God-talk is either factual or 
symbolical, and thus grounds for extrapolations to the nature of religious invisibilia. 
Since no one “can form correct ideas about God guided by nature or reason alone, 
without the word or message of God” (YP 6:132), there is no curtain of 
phenomena that reason can boldly thrust aside to disclose the divine reality, nor 
can we speculatively infer the divine nature by analogy either to our own or 
creation’s:  
 
For granting that, both in the literal and figurative 
descriptions of God, he is exhibited not as he really is, but 
in such a manner as may be within the scope of our 
comprehensions, yet we ought to entertain such a 
conception of him, as he, in condescending to 
accommodate himself to our capacities, has shown that he 
desires we should conceive. For it is on this very account 
that he has lowered himself to our level, lest in our flights 
above the reach of human understanding, and beyond the 
written word of Scripture, we should be tempted to indulge 
in vague cogitations and subtleties. [Quamvis enim hoc 
concedatur, Deum, non qualis in se est, sed qualem nos capere 
possumus, talem semper vel describi vel adumbrari, nos tamen nihilo 
minus debebiums talem prorsus nostra concipere, qualis ipse sed 
captum accommodans nostrum, vult concipi; ob id ipsum enim se ad 
nos demisit, ne nos elati supra captum humanum supraque quod 
scriptum est, vagis cogitationibus atque argutiis locum daremus.] (CM 
14:30-33)  
 
The consequence of this radical constraint upon inference, which expresses the 
distinction between creature and creator, is that we are neither to add to or subtract 
from the scriptural picture of God according to our own judgments: “to do so 
would be to follow the example of men, who are always inventing more and more 
subtle theories about him” (YP 6:134). Thus Milton rejects the theological 
ascription to God of human feelings (anthropopathy) except as the sacred text 
applies such ideas to him. When scripture says of God that he “repents,” “is 
grieved in his heart,” “rested and was refreshed,” “feared the enemy’s displeasure,” 
Milton exhorts the reader to ascribe these emotions to him as a picture devised to 
convey what remains perpetually beyond our understanding, and for us to use in 
order to have relationship with the divine: “let us believe that it is not beneath 
God to feel what grief he does feel, to be refreshed by what refreshes him, and to 







In justifying this tact, he go so far as to enlist the selem elohim, in which God 
is said to have created man in his own image, after his own likeness, Gen. i. 26, and not only 
his mind but also his external appearance” (YP 6:135): “if God habitually assign 
to himself the members and form of man, why should we be afraid of attributing 
to him what he attributes to himself, so long as what is imperfect and weakness 
when viewed in reference to ourselves be considered as most complete and 
excellent when imputed to God” (CM 14:35). For Milton, the selem elohim not only 
emphasizes the legitimacy of scriptural anthropomorphism, which we cannot 
controvert, but also the dignity of human being, including the human body, to 
whose order of creatural existence its creator adapts his words, and enfolds his 
nature in the incarnation. In short, for Milton, scripture’s way of speaking shows 
us how, miracles having ceased, to find God in the world, which is neither by 
confining significance to the superficial or ostensible sense of things, nor by 
denying their embodied, circumstantial force in favor of a wholesale metaphysical 
translation. If I may put it this way, God is always an implication of experience, as 
Milton explains in the first pages of Christian Doctrine, within phenomena but never 
the same as them, owing to the insuperable distinction between creature and 
creator, the caused and the causeless, finite and infinite.  
The revelation of God through the Son and Christ, which comprise 
scripture’s subject, effectively model this hermeneutic for Milton. Unlike his 
Father (in gospel usage), the Son was created by God voluntarily, “within the 
bounds of time” (YP 6:209), “endowed with the divine nature and whom similarly, 
when the time was ripe, God miraculously brought forth his human nature from 
the Virgin Mary” (YP 6:211). In Milton’s subordinationism, the Son is not unmade 
or eternal but begotten by divine decree “before the foundations of the world,” 
and possessed of the divine nature to the extent that the Father elects to bestow 
it upon him. As a creature, he can be seen and heard where the Father cannot, and 
is thus preeminently the image of God—“the brightness of his glory and the image of his 
substance”—deity’s persona and himself the agent of divine creation in time, after 
Hebrews 1, and finally “the only mediator between God and man” (YP 6:211).  
In short, for Milton, the Son as creature is the embodied subject of 
historical theophany (as are the angels), distinguished from God by his name and 
relation but more profoundly by his experiential status and role. Indeed, he is all 
that can be known of deity in this life and in Paradise Lost, where the angels in their 
song of praise reproduce Isaiah’s sight of the Lord in the temple, whom Milton 
more than once identifies not as deity but as the Son or an angel. And with the 
event of the Son’s incarnation as Jesus and the Christ, deity invests godhead in the 
bodily life of human being no less than in creatural existence with the begetting of 
the Son, even as the distinction is still maintained and in fact compounded: every 
revelation, every manifestation of the divine within time is thus not only a picture 
of itself that deity elects to create, but its form is always an assemblage of modes 
of existence distinct from each other: creator from creature, divine from human, 
self from experience. Yet as Milton says of the theanthropos—“God-man”—the Son 
as the person Jesus of Nazareth, they “coalesce [coaluere]” in each individual to 







It follows from his theology that Milton has no use for any order of 
transcendence that is not strictly conceptual and moral, conducted within the 
phenomenal bounds set by human life. Disdain for the body is disdain for the 
creature and its creator; and it is no small irony that satanic rationalism has as its 
contrapasso the increasing incarnation of the apostate, whose refined substance 
gradually grows more gross with their sin even as their original glory is obscured. 
At the same time, Milton rejects sheer sensory engrossment of an undifferentiated, 
Nietzschean kind because it collapses mind with body to the exclusion of their 
distinction, and thus the possibility of that inevident order of existence and 
meaning which belongs to res non apparentes—those things which do not appear as 
such, like the hidden God, a person’s self, the significance and destiny of a life or 
a nation, or the sense of the text. They are consequently the subject of faith, as 
“the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” in the words 
of Hebrews 11:1.  
Thus Milton himself “cannot praise a fugitive and a cloister’d vertue, 
unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks 
out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and 
heat” (YP 2:515). In other words, virtue is nothing if it consists in mere negation 
and rigid abstinence, whose “whitenesse” in Milton’s own disdainful words “is but 
an excrementall whitenesse,” because in satanic fashion it rejects the claims of 
experience upon understanding—a conviction the poet held as early as the 
companion poems and Comus, where (I have argued) the Lady undergoes a rape 
that, however figural in its expression, gives an existential edge to Miltonic chastity, 
not to say Comus’ version of seizing the day. Milton’s eccentric substitution of that 
notional virtue for charity, and his remarks on chastity in the Apology for 
Smectymnuus, where he defends himself against charges of debauchery, have given 
the poet the reputation of a prig. But what Milton means by chastity is not 
abstinence but rather temperance—the exercise of discretion, proportion, 
moderation in the conduct of life—and as he and the Lady argue against Comus’ 
libertinism, the opposite of Stoic apatheia or indifference. A prig would not picture 
sex in paradise or imagine angelic coitus, nor would he write how “half her swelling 
breast / Naked met his under the flowing gold / Of her loose tresses hid” (LM: 
PL 4.495-97), or imagine how the “youthful beauty” of the cherub Zephon 
abashes Satan, who “felt how awful goodness is, and saw / Virtue in her shape 
how lovely, saw, and pined / His loss” (LM: PL 4.845-49).  
There is a moral intelligence to be gained from experience, directed by 
sensation and emotion, that Milton will not willingly let go. Embodiment also 
describes the limit conditions of our mutable, finite being and consequently of our 
understandings, which are confined not to sensory experience as such but to the 
meanings that experience implicates, indicative both of evident and inevident 
existences and operations. It is these Adam calls “my fill / Of knowledge, what 
this vessel can contain; / Beyond which was my folly to aspire” (LM:PL 12.558-
60). In other words, the “paradise within . . . happier far” that Michael promises 
our first parents is not subjectivity insulated from the body’s sensory pollution, or 







unmatched philosopher of embodiment, pronounces against all “humours soaring 
to transcendency”:  
 
It is an accomplishment, absolute and as it were God-like, 
to know to enjoy our being as we ought. We seek other 
attributes because we do not understand the use of our own; 
and, having no knowledge of what is within, we sally forth 
outside ourselves. A fine thing to get up on stilts; for even 
on stilts we must still walk with our legs! And upon the 
finest throne in the world, we are seated, still, upon our 
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